How is hzzy logic usually formalized? There are many seemingly reasonable requirements that a logic should satisfy: e.g., since A&B and B&A are the same, the corresponding and-operation should be commutative. Similarly, since A&A means the same as A, we should expect that the and-operation should also satisfy this property, etc. It turns out to be impossible to satisfy all these seemingly natural requirements, so usually, some requirements are picked as absolutely true (like commutativity or associativity), and others are ignored if they contradict to the picked ones.
Introduction
In many application areas, there are tasks which take a lot of expert's time; example: interpreting the satellite photos. It is desirable to automate these time-consuming tasks.
One of the main obstacles to automating expert activity is the fact that experts often cannot express their activity in precise terms, they use vague (hzzy) terms from natural language to describe it. For example, in satellite photo interpretation, an expert may follow a rule like "ifan object is very small, it is probably a speckle unless a similar object appears on different photos of the same area"; here, "very small" and "similar" are examples of fuzzy terms from natural language.
To describe such fuzzy words, L. Zadeh proposed to use a special generalization of 2-valued logic called hzzy logic, in whicha statement, in addition to being absolutely true and absolutely false, can also take additional truth values corresponding to uncertainty. How is fuzzy logic usually formalized ( [4] , [SI)? There are many seemingly reasonable requirements that a logic should satisfy: e.g., since A&B and B&A are the same, the corresponding andoperation should be conxnutative. Similarly, since A&A means the same as A, we should expect that the and-operation should also satisfy this property, etc. It turns out to be impossible to satisfy all these seemingly natural requirements, so usually, some requirements are picked as absolutely true (like Commutativity or associativity), and others are ignored if they contradict to the picked ones.
This idea leads to a neat mathematical theory, but the analysis of real-life expert reasoning shows that all the requirements are only approximately satisfied. Therefore, to achieve a more adequate representation of expert reasoning, instead of fixing some requirements as absolute and ignoring the others, we should require all ofthese requirements to be satisfied to some extent. In this paper, we show the preliminary results of analyzing such operations. 0-7803-7087-2/01/$10.00 0 2001 IEEE In particular, we show that non-associative operations explain the empirical 7 f 2 law in psychology according to which a person can normally distinguish between no more than 7 plus minus 2 classes.
First Approach
If we know the degrees of certainty (subjective probabilities) p(S1) and p(S2) in two statements SI and 5'2, then possible values of p( SI& 5'2 ) form an interval
As a numerical estimate, it is natural to use a midpoint of this interval: p1 &pz Sf Similar, for the "or"-operation, we can take the midpoint of the corresponding interval [m=bllP2),midPl + P21 I)]:
There is a problem with these operations. Indeed, any "and" operation pl & p2 enables us to produce an estimate for P(S1& 52) provided that we know estimates p l for p(S1) andpz for p(S2 By itself, a small non-associativity may not 0 associativity comes from the requirement that our reasoning be rational, while it is well known that our actual handling of uncertainty is not exactly following rationality requirements; see, e.g., [9] . So, it is desirable to fkd out how nonassociative can these operations be.
To be more precise, we know that the midpoint operations are non-associative, i.e., that
We want to know how big can the difference
Theorem 1 [2].
be so bad:
Human.experts do not use all the numbers from the interval [0,1] to describe their possible degrees of belief; they use a few words like "very probable", "mildly probable", etc. Each of words is a "granule" covering the entire sub-interval of values. Since the largest possible non-associativity degree ((a&b)&c -a&(b&c)l is equal to 1/9, this non-associativity is negligible if the corresponding realistic "granular" degree of belief have granules of width _> 1/9. One can fit no more than 9 granules of such width in the interval [0,1]. This may explain why humans are most comfortable with _< 9 items to choose from -the famous "7 plus minus 2" law; see, This general psychological law has also been confirmed in our specific area of formalizing expert knowledge: namely, in [l] , it was shown that this law explains why in intelligent control, experts normally use 5 9 different degrees (such as "small", '.medium", etc.) to describe the value of each characteristic.
e.g., [5,61.
Instead of selecting a midpoint, we can make a more general selection of a value in the interval p. By a choice function, we mean a function s that maps every interval U = [U-, U? into a point s(u) E U so that for every candX > 0:
(un it-invariance) .
Proposition 1 [7] . Every choice function has the form s ([u-,ur 
The combination p =a . p -+ (1 -a) . p+ (first proposed by Hurwicz [3] ) has been successhlly used in areas ranging from submarine detection to petroleum engineering [7] ; in [ 1 11, this approach is applied to second-order probabilities.
With this approach, we get the following formulas which generalize the above definitions:
Comment. This non-associativity degree is the smallest (= 0) when Q = 0 or a = 1, and the largest (= 1/9) for midpoint operations (a = 0.5).
In ow proof, it was useful to first show that the new operations have some properties of associativity: namely, it turns out that for every a, both operations are semi-associative in the
Second Approach
A t-norm a & b describes the degree to which two conditions A and B are both satisfied if we know that the first condition A is satisfied with a degree a, and the second condition B is satisfied with a degree b.
In effect, t-norms describe the situations when both conditions are absolutely necessary, so that if one of the conditions is not satisfied, we completely reject the corresponding alternative. There are many such situations, but there are also many other situations, in which, although we say that we want the first condition to be satisfied and the second condition to be satisfied, etc., but if one of these conditions is not satisfied, we may still consider the corresponding alternative.
For example, a computer science department may be looking for a person who is a brilliant researcher and a very good lecturer and is knowledgeable in all the areas of computer science, i.e., in data structures and in operating systems and in software engineering etc. I&-ally, all these conditions should be met. However, if a brilliant researcher with a reputation of a good lecturer applies for a position, then, even if he does not know anything about operating systems, a department would most probably not definitely reject him.
In short, in many real-life situations, even if one of the conditions A, B is not satisfied at all, e.g., if a = 0, we may still have some non-zero degree of belief in the conjunction A&B -in direct contrast to the fact that for a t-norm, in this case, O & b = 0. This difference between the formal notion of a t-norm and the human use of "and" was noticed several decades ago, in the experiments of H.-J. Zimmermann and P. Zysno described in [12] . To get a more adequate description of human "and"-operations, the authors of [ 121 propose to use, instead oftnorm, a combination (e.g., linear combination) of a t-norm and a t-conorm, e.g., to use a combination
Such a combination is also not associative. How non-associative can it be? To answer this question, we prove that it is semi-associative: 
hence
The difference between the expressions (6) and In this case,
The difference between the expressions (6) and (1 0) is equal to:
where by CT, we denoted the expression (20 -1) .c.
Due to (9), we have -a.( 1-a) .a-a2.c+ (Za-l) .c = (1 -a)2 .a-(1 -a y .c = (1 -a y . (a-C) .
Since a 1 c, we conclude that 0 2 0, hence the difference between (6) and (1 0) is also nonnegative. So, for this second case, the desired inequality is also proven.
2'. Let us now prove that b & ( a & c ) 2 c&(a&b).
Since a 2 b, we have a& b = (1 -a ) .a+a b.
From a 2 c and b 1 c, we conclude that
Thus,
To prove the desired inequality, we consider the same two cases as in Part 1 of this proof.
2.1O. Let us first consider the case when b 2 (a&c).
In this case, b & (a & c) is described by the expression (8) . The difference between the expressions (8) and (1 1) is equal to
where by U, we denoted the expression:
Due to (7), we have
Since a 2 c, we conclude that CT 2. 0, hence the difference between (8) and (1 1) is also nonnegative. So, for this case, the desired inequality is proven. . The first expression is described by the formula (6), the second by the formula (1 l), thus, the difference between these expressions is equal to the difference between these formulas, i.e., to:
Since a 2 c, the difference a -c can take val- 
Third Approach
In the above text, we only talked about "and" and "or" operations. What about more complex logical operations? If we fix "and", "or", and ''not'' operations, then we can, in principle, knowing the degree of belief in the basic statements, determine the degree of belief in their logical combination Q. To do that, we represent the given formula Q as a combination of &, V, and -I, and then consequently use our chosen operations with degrees of belief instead of these logical symbols.
There is a problem with this approach Every expression can be described in several different ways in terms of the basic logical opera- p p ( a , . , . , b) of d ( F ) . It is therefore desirable to describe the interval formed by the smallest and the largest possible values of d ( F ) for all F that correspond to a given formula. This idea was first described by Tiirkvn in [lo] . It turns out that if we use min and max, then the smallest and the largest values can be explicitly described. Every propositional formula can be transformed into a unique complete CNF or into a uniquely defined complete DNF form. These unique formulas will be denoted by CNF (F) and DNF(F). 
